Inscriere cercetatori

Site nou !

Daca nu va puteti recupera parola (sau aveti alte probleme), scrieti-ne la pagina de contact. Situl vechi se gaseste la adresa


The shark game: equilibrium with bounded rationality

Domenii publicaţii > Ştiinţe sociale + Tipuri publicaţii > Articol în volumul unei conferinţe

Autori: Lucian Daniel Stanciu-Viziteu

Editorial: Andrea Teglio, Simone Alfarano, Eva Camacho-Cuena and Miguel Ginés-Vilar, Springer, Managing Market Complexity: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 662, p.103-111, 2012.


We propose an intuitive toy model of a financial market where investors
are represented by hungry sharks. Each shark learns the best strategy through a trial
and error procedure calibrated to human characteristics. The mix of rewards for eating
or not can create a large array of scenarios that can be used to observe the emergence
of equilibrium from simple to more realistic situations. Using an agent-based
model we create an environment where sharks learn and try to optimize their payoffs.
Our preliminary results show that sharks,like investors, can learn to coordinate
and generate a equilibrium under rational expectations. We also find cases where
equilibirum cannot be found and the situation becomes a minority-type game

Cuvinte cheie: finante, comportament, echilibru, optim // finance, behaviour, equilibrium solution, optimal