Autori: Cristian Ciocan

Editorial: Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 41, p.64-77, 2010.

Rezumat:

I will try to outline in this article the main functions of the problem of
boredom in Heidegger’s thought. My area of investigation is the phenomenology of affectivity developed between Being and Time and the course held in 1929-1930, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. My suggestion is that boredom is called to cover a certain dualistic schematism in
the phenomenology of affectivity of Being and Time: between fear and anxiety,
ontical and ontological, existenziell and existenzial, inauthentic and authentic. I will argue that, by means of the three forms of boredom, Heidegger proposed a more elastic image of the affective life, in order to sustain in a more grounded manner the passage from inauthenticity to authenticity. First, I will discuss the place of affects in Being and Time, emphasising in
the first place the concepts of Befindlichkeit and Stimmung, and then the topics of fear and anxiety. In this frame, I will subsequently situate the appearance of boredom (related to anxiety) in “What Is Metaphysics?”. Finally, I will discuss the three forms of boredom analysed in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, regarding their structural constitutive moments.

Cuvinte cheie: affectivity, fear, anxiety, moods, phenomenology